Analytic Existential Thomism - A Brief Outline

Outline of the account and contrast with contemporary theories of existence

Analytic Existential Thomism -Turner C Nevitt -Condensed Notes

Overall Focus: These excerpts delve into the intersection of Analytic Philosophy and Thomistic thought, specifically focusing on the nature of existence. The core tension is between the standard analytic view (rooted in Frege, Russell, and Quine) and Aquinas's view of existence. The goal is to explore the possibility of reconciling these seemingly disparate perspectives to develop an "Analytic Existential Thomism".

I. The Clash of Perspectives on Existence:

•

Main Theme: The fundamental divide lies in how existence is understood: as a first-order property of individuals (Aquinas's "commonsense" view) versus a second-order property of properties (the Frege-Russell-Quine view).

•

The "Commonsense" View (Associated with Aquinas): Existence is a property that individuals or objects can possess, similar to other properties. "’Socrates exists’ ascribes a property to a single individual, that is, existence to Socrates." Aquinas sees existence as "something really had by individuals or objects and sensibly expressible by a first-order predicate attributed to them. In that sense he thinks that existence is a property of individuals or objects, which is the commonsense view."

•

The Frege-Russell-Quine View: Existence is not a property of individuals or objects. It is a second-order property, indicating that a first-order property is instantiated or has an instance. "According to the Frege-Russell-Quine view, however, existence is not similar to other properties we ascribe to individuals or objects. Indeed, existence is not a property of individuals or objects at all...Rather, it says that a certain property (other than existence) has an instance or is instantiated." "This view of existence is often stated as such: existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier, “∃x,” interpreted as meaning, “There is an x such that…” or “For some x…”" Any statement about existence can be paraphrased using the existential quantifier and a first-order predicate other than "exists." "every sensible use of the word “exist(s)” can be paraphrased in terms of the existential quantifier and a first order predicate (other than “exist(s),” of course)." Thus, “Socrates exists” is rephrased as "There is an x such that x is Socrates".

II. Critique of the Frege-Russell-Quine View:

•

Core Argument: The excerpts presents a critique of the standard analytic interpretation of existence, highlighting what are argued to be critical flaws that support a return to the commonsense view.

•

Presupposition of Existence: The Frege-Russell-Quine view presupposes existence rather than explaining it. Property instantiation requires an existing entity. "...an individual or object must exist in order to instantiate any properties."

•

Inability to Account for the Existence of Properties: The view leads to an infinite regress when applied to the existence of properties themselves. If the existence of a property requires it to instantiate another property, and so on, no property could actually be said to exist. "The regress appears to be vicious since no property will exist unless the other property it instantiates exists, which will not exist unless the other property it instantiates exists, and so on to infinity.”

•

Failure to Analyze Singular Existential Statements: The Frege-Russell-Quine view struggles with existential statements involving proper names ("Socrates exists"), demonstratives ("that exists"), indexicals ("I exist"), and general terms like "something". "...even though “Something exists” is perfectly meaningful and obviously true, there is no hope of paraphrasing it in terms of the instantiation of a property (other than existence), since the word “something” does not suggest any properties at all."

III. Aquinas's View of Existence ("Esse"):

•

Key Concept: Aquinas views existence (esse) not as a static property, but as a dynamic act or actuality (actus essendi). The verb "to be" (esse) signifies the "act of existing". "...the word ‘existent’ [ens] is imposed from the act of existing [actus essendi]." "...as change is the act [actus] of a changeable thing insofar as it is changeable, so existence [esse] is the act [actus] of an existent [ens] insofar as it is an existent [ens]."

•

First-Order Predicate: Aquinas considers "exists" (est) as a first-order predicate that can be attributed to individuals. "This word ‘exists’ [est] signifies in the first place that which occurs to the mind in the sense of actuality absolutely. For ‘exists,’ predicated by itself, signifies actual existence [esse]. Thus it signifies as a verb."

•

Accidental, Yet Essential: Aquinas views existence as "accidental" because it's not part of a thing's essence, but "essential" because a thing cannot be without it.

•

Source of Actuality: Existence is the most fundamental source of a thing's actuality. Without existence, a thing is nothing.

•

Potentiality and Actuality: Aquinas relates a things essence and existence to the relationship between potentiality and actuality.

IV. Defending Aquinas's View:

•

Addressing Objections: The excerpts address criticisms that Aquinas's view is nonsensical, arguing that such criticisms often beg the question by assuming the sole validity of the second-order analysis of existence.

•

Begging the Question: The objection that statements like "Socrates exists" are nonsensical because "exists" is being treated as a first-order predicate, begs the question because it assumes that only second-order talk is sensible. "For the statement 'Socrates exists' is only shown to be nonsense by assuming that the only sensible talk of existence is second-order talk."

•

Two-Sense View: The excerpts consider the possibility of a "two-sense" view, where second-order analysis applies to general existential statements ("Men exist") and first-order analysis applies to particular existential statements ("Socrates exists").

•

Lack of Independent Reasons: The document stresses the need for a justification as to why "first-order ascriptions of existence to individuals or objects are meaningless in the first place. Yet there are no such reasons."

•

Critique of Miller's Linguistic Defense: One excerpt critiques a specific strategy for defending Aquinas that relies on the priority of linguistic categories over ontological ones. It argues that this approach is incompatible with Aquinas's own philosophical framework, where ontological categories are primary. “In seeking to describe something of the actual categorial structure of the world, I shall be following Frege in maintaining the priority of linguistic categories over ontological ones.”, as Miller said, conflicts with Aquinas’s view that, "As Thomas sees things, supreme and diverse modes of predication (as expressed in the predicaments) ultimately follow from and depend upon supreme and diverse modes of being."

•

A Better Defense Strategy: Argues that a better defensive strategy for a Thomist would need to be based on his view of the "indirect relationship between language and reality" by examining and justifying Aquinas's ontological position as the basis for his logic and linguistic analysis.

•

Defense Through Explanatory Power: A key argument is that Aquinas's view should be defended by demonstrating its descriptive and explanatory power in addressing metaphysical issues. "If Aquinas’s view is useful, it is a "good reason to think it is true, and thus that existence is in fact a real property of individuals or objects."

•

Practical Applications: This is illustrated through examples like explaining Divine Simplicity, Primary and Secondary Causality, Intensity of Qualities, Distinction within a Genus, and the difference between Reality and Thought.

•

Contemporary Applications: The possibility that Aquinas's view of existence could provide a better foundation for current metaphysical discussions such as essentialism, substance-attribute ontology, and ontological pluralism is also proposed.

V. Implications and Goals:

•

Relevance to Analytic Philosophy: The text highlights an ongoing debate within contemporary analytic philosophy concerning the nature of existence and its relationship to language and reality.

•

Significance for Thomism: Exploring Analytic Existential Thomism offers a potential avenue for Thomistic thought to engage with mainstream philosophy. "By the end of the article I hope to have allayed at least some of the doubts about the possibility of developing an Analytic Existential Thomism."

•

Reconciliation Project: The excerpts represent a contribution towards reconciling seemingly opposed philosophical traditions through a careful examination of core concepts. The encouragement is aimed towards Thomists who may be hesitant to engage with contemporary analytic philosophers, with some mention that the current views are beginning to consider certain Thomist views regarding existence. "The fact that the analogy of being—the most maligned Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine—is being seriously discussed by contemporary analytic philosophers should encourage Thomists who are hesitant to engage such philosophers with Aquinas’s view of existence."

In conclusion, these excerpts lay the groundwork for a complex philosophical project. By identifying the core disagreements between analytic and Thomistic perspectives on existence, critiquing the standard analytic view, and outlining potential strategies for defending Aquinas's position, they pave the way for further exploration of Analytic Existential Thomism. The focus on Aquinas' view of existence as "actus essendi", or an act of being, is particularly important in understanding the nuances of this philosophical endeavor.